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Abstract
In this report, we present recent work on the language of functional active
objects ASPfun.
We first introduce briefly the language ASPfun, its syntax and semantics.
Then, we present a method for static security checking for our functional dis-
tributed active object language. We show how the type system of ASPfun is
easily extensible for noninterference: a type system that enables analyzing an
ASPfun program statically – prior to execution – detects information flows that
contradict a given security policy. To prove this conjecture, we introduce the
definition of an indistinguishability relation and prove the noninterference theo-
rem that shows that this indistinguishability relation is a bisimulation on ASPfun
executions.
In a second part, we investigate the question of distributed consensus in
ASPfun. We implement Paxos, a distributed consensus algorithm due to Lam-
port, in ASPfun. This implementation illustrates how functional active objects
behave when stateful operations occur.
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Chapter 1
ASPfun Semantics
In this section, we briefly recall the definition of the language ASPfun [8] a func-
tional active object language. The language and a (classical) type system are
formalized in Isabelle/HOL; type safety is proved, i.e. preservation and progress
implying deadlock-freedom [8]. We present here only the syntax and semantics
of ASPfun. In the following section only, we introduce the noninterference type
system that is an extension of the classical one.
1.1 Syntax
s, t ::= x variable
| [lj = ς(xj , yj)tj ]j∈1..n (∀j, xj 6= yj) object definition
| s.li(t) (i ∈ 1..n) method call
| s.li := ς(x, y)t (i ∈ 1..n, x 6= y) update
| Active(s) Active object creation
| α active object reference
| fi future reference
1.2 Semantics
A configuration is a set of activities. Each activity possesses a single active ob-
ject, which is a ς-calculus term. Activating an object, Active(s), means creating
a new activity with the object s to be activated becoming an active object.1 It
is immutable. A request sent to an activity is an invocation to the active object;
it is processed by the activity. The set of requests processed by an activity is
called request queue by similarity with the active object model but, here, as the
calculus is functional, requests can be treated in an unordered fashion.
C ::= αi[(fj 7→ sj)j∈Ii , ti]i∈1..p where {Ii} are disjoint subsets of N
1In the ς-calculus every term is an object.
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call
li ∈ {lj}j∈1..n
E
[
[lj = ς(xj , yj)sj ]j∈1..n.li(t)
]→ς E [si{xi ← [lj = ς(xj , yj)sj ]j∈1..n, yi ← t}]
update
li ∈ {lj}j∈1..n
E
[
[lj = ς(xj , yj)sj ]j∈1..n.li := ς(x, y)t
]→ς E [[li = ς(x, y)t, lj = ς(xj , yj)sj∈(1..n)−{i}j ]]
local
s→ς s′
α[fi 7→ s ::Q, t] :: C →‖ α[fi 7→ s′ ::Q, t] :: C
active
γ /∈ (dom (C) ∪ {α}) noFV(s)
α[fi 7→ E[Active(s)] ::Q, t] :: C →‖ α[fi 7→ E[γ] ::Q, t] :: γ[∅, s] :: C
request
fk fresh noFV(s) α 6= β
α [fi 7→ E[β.l(s)] ::Q, t] :: β[R, t′] :: C →‖ α [fi 7→ E[fk] ::Q, t] :: β [fk 7→ t′.l(s) ::R, t′] :: C
self-request
fk fresh noFV(s)
α [fi 7→ E[α.l(s)] ::Q, t] :: C →‖ α [fk 7→ t.l(s) :: fi 7→ E[fk] ::Q, t] :: C
reply
β[fk 7→ s ::R, t′] ∈ α[fi 7→ E[fk] ::Q, t] :: C
α[fi 7→ E[fk] ::Q, t] :: C →‖ α[fi 7→ E[s] ::Q, t] :: C
update-AO
γ /∈dom (C)∪{α}
noFV(ς(x, y)s) β[R, t′]∈α[fi 7→ E[β.l:=ς(x, y)s] ::Q, t] ::C
α[fi 7→ E[β.l := ς(x, y)s] :: Q, t] :: C →‖ α[fi 7→ E[γ] :: Q, t] :: γ[∅, t′.l := ς(x, y)s] :: C
Table 1.1: ASPfun semantics
Classically, we define contexts as expressions with a single hole (•). E[s]
denotes the term obtained by replacing the single hole by s.
E ::= • | [li = ς(x, y)E, lj = ς(xj , yj)tj∈(1..n)−{i}j ] |E.li(t) |
s.li(E) |E.li := ς(x, y)s | s.li := ς(x, y)E|Active(E)
The initial configuration contains a single request, the user program:
initConf(s0) = α[f0 7→ s0, []]
where s0 is a static term without free variable.
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Chapter 2
Noninterference
2.1 Introduction
Information flow security [4] and its analysis [5] is the attempt to detect the
ways that information flows through the state of a program. Noninterference
[6] is the formal notion of confidentiality: the state of a program being com-
partmented and assigned to security classes must not allow such interference
between compartments that would represent a read-up or a write-down. To
give a simpler intuition of noninterference: presuming only two classes H (high
for confidential) and L (for low or public), an attacker must not learn anything
about the information contained in the H variables if he can observe all L vari-
ables. The attacker can see all L inputs and outputs of the program on as many
runs as he likes, without being able to detect any difference on the L values if
the H values change. That is, the L variables are completely independent of
the H ones.
The idea to use type systems for a static analysis has first been elaborated
by Volpano, Smith and Irvine [19, 18]. For a concise overview of noninterfer-
ence type systems, the survey by Sabelfeld and Myers is recommended [15].
The work by Banerjee and Naumann introduced the techniques for handling
noninterference proofs in dynamic structures that we adapt and clarify for our
noninterference proof. Proofs of language semantics and type safety are already
complex and very technical; noninterference proofs do not stand back. Thus,
following a similar trend for semantics and types, more recently, the analysis of
noninterference has triggered work on mechanizations of such security proofs in
interactive proof assistants, e.g. [17, 9]. As static analysis of noninterference is
incarnated in type systems, the same advantages that have motivated classical
type soundness mechanizations remain valid: from a type system mechanized
in Isabelle or Coq, executable code can be generated that represents a security
analyser (that is moreover certified if corresponding soundness proofs have been
conducted in the proof assistant).
The security type system is an extension of the existing type system of
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ASPfun [8] by security types from the lattice 〈{H,L}, L ≤ H〉. The extension is
by building pairs of “old” types and security types, L or H. This new type sys-
tem contains the classical type system thus also guaranteeing deadlock-freedom
[8]. We will show subsequently that this slight extension of the original type
system additionally proves information flow security. Let us, however first for-
mally introduce the security type system. In Table 2.1, we find the local type
system defining inductively the types of local terms. We use the type vari-
able δ ∈ {L,H} for simple security types and A to denote classical types or
structured types, i.e. pairs of classical types and L or H.
Base
L ≤ H
Subsumption
` x : (A, δ) δ ≤ δ′
` x : (A, δ′)
Val x
x :A :: T ` x :A
Type Object
A = ([li : BiDi]i∈1..n, δ) ∀i ∈ 1..n, xi :A :: yi : (Bi, δ) :: T ` ti : (Di, δ)
T ` [li = ς(xi : A, yi : Bi)ti]i∈1..n : A
Type Call
T ` s : ([li : BiDi] i∈1..n, δ)
j ∈ 1..n T ` t : (Bj , δ)
T ` s.lj(t) : (Dj , δ)
Type Update
A = ([li : BiDi]i∈1..n, δ) T ` s : A
j ∈ 1..n x :A :: y : (B, δ) :: T ` t : (Dj , δ)
T ` s.lj := ς(x : A, y : B)t : A
Table 2.1: Typing the local calculus
The following preservation theorem can be derived by referring directly to
the corresponding theorem for the classical type system [8].
Theorem 1 (Subject Reduction).
`C :〈Γact,Γfut〉 ∧ C →‖ C ′ ⇒ ∃ Γ′act,Γ′fut. `C ′ :〈Γ′act,Γ′fut〉
where Γact ⊆ Γ′act, and Γfut ⊆ Γ′fut.
Proof. The proof of subject reduction for the classical type system stays valid
because the noninterference type system just extends the classical type system
by new type components L and H. Therefore, the new typing relation can only
be more restrictive. If `class C : 〈Γ′act,Γ′fut〉 in the classical type system, then
`C :〈Γ?act,Γ?fut〉 in the new noninterference type system for some extension by L
and H. Let Eact and Efut such that Eact(Γact) = Γ
?
act and Efut(Γfut) = Γ
?
fut.
If now C →‖ C ′ – due to the classical subject reduction theorem [8] – we
have that ∃ Γ′act,Γ′fut. `class C ′ : 〈Γ′act,Γ′fut〉. Then we generally have that
`C ′ :〈E′act(Γ′act), E′fut(Γ′fut)〉 where the dashes on the extensions symbolize the
continuation by L,H for new elements created by future or activity creation.
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Type Active
〈Γact,Γfut〉, T ` a : A
〈Γact,Γfut〉, T ` Active(a) : A
Type Activity Reference
β ∈ dom (Γact)
〈Γact,Γfut〉, T ` β : Γact(β)
Type Future Reference
fk ∈ dom (Γfut)
〈Γact,Γfut〉, T ` fk : Γfut(fk)
Type Configuration
dom (Γact) = dom (C) dom (Γfut) =
⋃
{dom (Q) | ∃ α, a. α[Q, a] ∈ C}
∀α[Q, a] ∈ C.
{〈Γact,Γfut〉,∅ ` a : Γact(α) ∧
∀ fi∈dom (Q). 〈Γact,Γfut〉,∅ ` Q(fi) : Γfut(fi)
` C : 〈Γact,Γfut〉
Table 2.2: Typing configurations
2.2 Indistinguishability and Noninterference
In this section, we show now that any well-typed program is secure. To this end,
we first define a relation of indistinguishability, often also called L-equivalence
because in this relation L-terms have to be equal.
To improve the exposition, we refer in the following only to the L/H com-
ponents of the types in all typing statements – without explicitly projecting out
the classical type constituents.
Lemma 2.2.1 (Confinement). Let ` C : 〈Γact,Γfut〉 and α[Q, t] ∈ C with
Γact(α) = δ for δ ∈ D. Then, we have that ∀ fk ∈ dom (Q). Γfut(fk) = δ.
Proof. Since ` C : 〈Γact,Γfut〉 it follows from Type Configuration for
(fk, s) ∈ Q, that 〈Γact,Γfut〉,∅ ` s : Γfut(fk). By Type Future Refer-
ence we also have that 〈Γact,Γfut〉,∅ ` fk : Γfut(fk). That is, s and fk have
the same type. As a consequence of the semantics for s, there exists s0 with
s0 →∗‖ s and s0 = t.l(p) for some former call to α that resulted by rule re-
quest to this t.l(p). By rule Type Call and Type Object, we know that
〈Γact,Γfut〉,∅ ` t.l(p) : δ if 〈Γact,Γfut〉,∅ ` t : δ which in turn follows by
Type Configuration from 〈Γact,Γfut〉,∅ ` α : δ which we know by assump-
tion. By preservation 〈Γact,Γfut〉,∅ ` s : δ because 〈Γact,Γfut〉,∅ ` so : δ and
s0 →∗‖ s. As we have seen earlier, the type of s is equal to the type of fk and
thus to the type of α. Since fk ∈ dom (Q) was arbitrary, we are finished.
Definition 2.2.2 (Typed Bijection). A typed bijection is a finite partial function
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σ on activities α (or futures fk respectively) such that
∀ a : dom (σ). ` a : T ⇒ ` σ(a) : T
(where T is given by Γact(a) or Γfut(a) respectively).
The intuition behind typed bijections is that dom (σ) designates all those
futures or activity references that are or have been visible to the attacker. We
cannot assume the names in different runs of programs, even for low elements,
to be the same. Hence, we relate those names via a pair of bijections. These
bijection are typed because they relate activities and futures that are all of type
L. The following definition of indistinguishability uses the typed bijection in this
sense. The intuitive relationship between type L and membership in dom (σ) is
only later made formal by an invariant. We believe that this invariant decisively
ameliorates the exposition of the proofs and the understanding of the model
(compare with the proofs in Banerjee and Naumann’s paper [1]).
We define (low)-indistinguishability as a relation ∼σ,τ parameterized by two
typed bijections one over activity names and one over futures. It is a heteroge-
neous relation as it ranges over elements of different types, for example activities
and request queues. We leave out the types as they are indicated by our nota-
tional convention. By Tσ,τ we denote the term (or type) T where all occurrences
of activity names a or futures f are replaced by their counterparts σ(a) or τ(f),
respectively, given they are in the domain, otherwise unchanged.1
Definition 2.2.3 (Indistinguishability). An indistinguishability relation is a
heterogeneous relation ∼σ,τ , parameterized by two isomorphisms σ and τ whose
differently typed subrelations are as follows.
t ∼σ,τ t′ ≡ tσ,τ = t′
α0 ∼σ,τ α1 ≡ τ(α0) = α1
fk ∼σ,τ fj ≡ σ(fk) = fj
[Rα0 , tα0 ] ∼σ,τ [Rα1 , tα1 ] ≡ Rα0 ∼σ,τ Rα1 ∧ tα0 ∼σ,τ tα1
Rα0 ∼σ,τ Rα1 ≡ dom (σ) ⊆ dom (Rα0) ∧ ran (σ) ⊆ dom (Rα1)∧∀ fk, fj .fk ∼σ,τ fj ⇒ Rα0(fk) ∼σ,τ Rα1(fj)
C0 ∼σ,τ C1 ≡ dom (τ) ⊆ dom (C0) ∧ ran (τ) ⊆ dom (C1)∧∀α0, α1. α0 ∼σ,τ α1 ⇒ C0(α0) ∼σ,τ C1(α1)
We repeat here the remark made by the designers of this kind of indis-
tinguishability definition [1]: “The above exploits the convention that equa-
tions involving partial functions are interpreted as false when the function is
undefined.” Thus, α0, α1 (or fk, fj , respectively) are in the relation ∼σ,τ if
1For types Γfut and Γact, the names are replaced in the domain which produces a somewhat
“contravariant” effect visible in the direction of the replacement.
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and only if (α0, α1) is in τ (or (fk, fj) ∈ σ, respectively) because otherwise
(τ(α0) = α1) = false (or (σ(fk) = fj) = false). In case of α0 /∈ dom (τ), for
example, C(α0) ∼σ,τ C(α1) could be true or false illustrating the partiality of
the definition of indistinguishability. The entire high part of the program is
not relevant for L-indistinguishability and thus not recorded at all in the corre-
sponding typed bijections. That is, “H-indistinguishability” really corresponds
to “indistinguishability not defined”.
The partial bijection approach is an elegant concept for specification but
technically proofs become hard to follows. Therefore, we explicitly mark the
correspondence between type L and domains of isomorphisms. The following
invariant specifies this correspondence.
Definition 2.2.4 (Invariant).
α0 ∈ dom (τ) ≡ Γact(α0) = L
fk ∈ dom (σ) ≡ Γfut(fk) = L
We write invariant(σ, τ) if the configurations are clear from context.
The invariant immediately transfers to the ranges of σ and τ because they
are typed bijections.
Corollary 2.2.5. If the invariant holds we also have the following equivalences.
α1 ∈ ran (τ) ≡ Γact(α1) = L
fj ∈ ran (σ) ≡ Γfut(fj) = L
Note, that the invariant only specifies this correspondence. The invariant is
a tool to clarify the proof of noninterference. Its validity for given typings and
pairs of configurations has to be established.
To ground the indistinguishability we define when two initial configurations
are indistinguishable.
Definition 2.2.6 (Initial Indistinguishability). Two well-typed initial configu-
rations initConf(s0) and initConf(s1) are indistinguishable (∼) if either s0 = s1
or Γact(α0) = Γact(α1) = H.
Using this idea of initial indistinguishability, we can establish that the in-
variant holds for initial configurations if they are indistinguishable.
Lemma 2.2.7 (Initial Invariant). Given two indistinguishable initial configu-
rations that are well-typed, the isomorphisms σ and τ can be constructed such
that the invariant holds.
∀ s0, s1.∃σ, τ.
{ 〈Γact,Γfut〉,∅ ` initConf(s0) : Γact(α0)
〈Γact,Γfut〉σ,τ ,∅ ` initConf(s1) : Γactσ,τ (α1)
initConf(s0) ∼ initConf(s1)
⇒ invariant(σ, τ)
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Proof. Let initConf(s0) and initConf(s1) be two well-typed indistinguishable
initial configurations. If s0 = s1 and 〈Γact,Γfut〉,∅ ` s0 : Γfut(f0) then
〈Γact,Γfut〉,∅ ` s1 : Γfut(f0) but also 〈Γact,Γfut〉σ,τ ,∅ ` s1 : Γfutσ,τ (f1).
Hence, by type uniqueness Γfut(f0) = Γfutσ,τ (f1) and by the Confinement
lemma Γact(α0) = Γactσ,τ (α1). If both sides are H, we are in the second
case (see below). If they are L, set τ(α0) = α1 and σ(f0) = σ(f1). Then, τ
and σ are well-defined typed bijections and the Invariant holds. If now, for the
second case, Γact(α0) = Γact(α1) = H then set τ = σ = ∅. Then, again, the
two maps are well-defined and the Invariant holds.
Corollary 2.2.8. The isomorphisms σ, τ constructed in the proof of the previous
lemma additionally turn the initial configuration indistinguishable in the sense
of Definition 2.2.3.
initConf(s0) ∼ initConf(s1)⇒ initConf(s0) ∼σ,τ initConf(s1)
Note, that if the initial configurations were not indistinguishable, their types
could be different in which case the existence of a pair of isomorphisms fulfilling
the invariant would be impossible. This lemma will be used to enable – in the
final Corollary 2.2.9 – the following main theorem proving the noninterference
of well-typed configurations. The main theorem assumes the invariant as a
hypothesis and shows that it is preserved.
Note, furthermore, that we prove a strong version of bisimulation in which
the second transition is →01‖ = id ∪ →‖ and not just →∗‖ (as, for example, in
[16]).
Theorem 2 (Noninterference). Let C0 and C1 be configurations such that
C0 ∼σ,τ C1, ` C0 : 〈Γact,Γfut〉 and ` C1 : 〈Γact,Γfut〉σ,δ, and the Invariant
holds. If C0 →‖ C ′0 then there exists C ′1 such that C1 →01‖ C ′1 and C ′0 ∼σ′,τ ′ C ′1
such that σ ⊆ σ′, τ ⊆ τ ′, and the invariant remains valid for σ′ and τ ′.
Proof. We proceed by case analysis and induction over the semantics →‖. In
each case, we define new σ′ and τ ′ based on the existing σ and τ for which the
invariant holds by assumption. The case analysis hinges on α ∈ dom (τ) and
f ∈ dom (σ) rather than L and H as in classical proofs, e.g. [16] (however, it
is important to keep in mind that this predicate corresponds to H/L-typing in
form of the proof invariant).
The high case is proved once for all cases of the semantic reduction. Let
α0 ∈ dom (C0) and α0 /∈ dom (τ) with C0(α0) 6= C ′0(α0), i.e. this activity has
been reduced. Let σ′ = σ, τ ′ = τ , and C ′1 = C1. Then, C
′
0 ∼σ,τ C ′1 because
dom (τ ′ = τ) ⊆ dom (C0) ⊆ dom (C ′0) and similarly for σ and C1. The new
activities that may have been introduced in case the reduction was with rules
active or update-AO are H since by the invariant from α0 /∈ dom (τ) follows
that Γact(α0) = H. In turn, by preservation and confinement, the new activities
have typeH whereby the invariant remains valid and indistinguishability as well.
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The other case α0 ∈ dom (C0) such that α0 ∈ dom (τ) and C0(α0) 6= C ′0(α0)
entails the low cases which are proved case by case following the semantics. Gen-
erally, we know as α0 ∈ dom (τ) that Γact(α0) = L and that τ(α0) = α1 for some
α1 ∈ dom (C1). Furthermore, Γactσ,τ (α1) = L because τ preserves types, and
all contained futures are L by confinement. Let for all cases C0(α0) = α0 [R0, t0]
and C1(α1) = [R1, t1].
Case 1 (local). Since C0 ∼σ,τ C1, we have R0 ∼σ,τ R1 which means
that ∀ fk, fj . fk ∼σ,τ fj ⇒ R0(fk) ∼σ,τ R1(fj). As the reduction was with
local, we have an fk with R0(fk) = E[s] and s →ς s′. Because of the In-
variant, we have Γact(α0) = L and because of confinement Γfut(fk) = L.
Hence, using the Invariant in the opposite sense, we have fk ∈ dom (σ), i.e.
σ(fk) = fj with R0(fk) ∼σ,τ R1(fj) which means (according to indistinguisha-
bility for terms) that R0(fk)σ,τ = R1(fj). That is R0(fk) = E(s) and hence
R1(fj) = Eσ,τ [sσ,τ ]. Since s →ς s′, also sσ,τ →ς s′σ,τ and since, clearly,
s′σ,τ = s
′
σ,τ , we have E[s] ∼σ,τ Eσ,τ [sσ,τ ]. We can thus set C ′1 with R′1 up-
dated to R1(fj 7→ Eσ,τ [s′σ,τ ]). Then, C1 →‖ C ′1, and C ′0 ∼σ,τ C ′1. The typed
bijections remain the same and – as there are no new L elements introduced –
consequently the Invariant remains valid.
Case 2 (active). Let C0(α0) = α0[R0, t0] with R0(fk) = E[Active(s)],
C ′0(β0) = β0[∅, s], and C ′0(α0) = α0[R′0, t0] such that R′0(fk) = E[β0] accord-
ing to semantic rule active. Similar to the previous case, since we consider
α0 ∈ dom (τ), we have, due to the Invariant, that Γact(α0) = L and conse-
quently (confinement) Γfut(fk) = L which again gives, by invariant(σ, τ) that
fk ∈ dom (σ). In turn, we know that there are α1 and fj with (α0, α1) ∈ τ and
(fk, fj) ∈ σ such that – due to indistinguishability – C1(α1) = α1[R1, t1] with
R1(fj) = Eσ,τ [Active(sσ,τ )]. We can select C ′1 = α1[R1(fj 7→ Eσ,τ [β1]), t1] ∪
β1[∅, sσ,τ ]. Then, C1 →‖ C ′1 by rule active as well. According to preser-
vation, the successor configurations are well-typed with types 〈Γact′,Γfut′〉 =
〈Γact(α1 7→ type(s)),Γfut〉 and with subscript σ′, τ ′ for C1 by typing rule Type
Active. The new activities β0 and β1 have type L by confinement and Type
Active; the new isomorphism is τ ′ = τ ∪ (β0, β1) for activities; the future iso-
morphism stays the same, σ′ = σ. Thereby, the Invariant remains true for σ′
and τ ′. Finally, we see that C ′0 ∼σ,τ C ′1.
Case 3 (request). Let for α0[R0, t0], according to the proviso of request,
R0(fk) = E[β0.l(s)] and C0(β0) = β0[Rβ0 , tβ0 ]. From confinement and local
typing rules, we know that types of α0 and β0 are equal. Since by invari-
ant, from α0 ∈ dom (τ), follows that Γact(α0) = L then so is Γact(β0). In
turn, β0 ∈ dom(τ) by invariant(σ, τ). In C ′0 we have R′0(fk) = E[fm], for
some fresh fm and R′β0 = Rβ0(fm 7→ tβ0 .l(s)). By confinement and preser-
vation, we know that Γfut
′(fm) must be L. Thus, there exist α1, β1 with
{(α0, α1), (β0, β1)} ⊆ τ , and fj , fh with {(fk, fj), (fm, fh)} ⊆ σ such that
C1(α1) = α0[R1, t1], C1(β1) = β1[Rβ1 , tβ1 ]. From R0(fk) ∼σ,τ R1(fj) follows
that R1(fj) = Eσ,τ [β1.l(sσ,τ )]. Now, set C ′1 such that R
′
1 = R1(fj 7→ Eσ,τ [fh])
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and Rβ1 = Rβ1(fh 7→ tβ1 .l(sσ,τ )). Then, C1 →‖ C ′1 by rule request. Set
σ′ = σ ∪ {(fm, fh)} and τ ′ = τ . Now, C ′0 ∼σ,τ C ′1 and invariant(σ′, τ ′) is valid.
Case 4 (self-request). This case is very similar to the previous case re-
quest by simply using α0 = β0, and α1 = β1.
Case 5 (reply). In this case, we have C0(α0) = α0[R0, t0] with R0(fk) =
E[fm] and C0(β0) = β0[Rβ0 , tβ0 ] with Rβ0(fm) = s. According to α0 ∈ dom (τ),
confinement, and typing rules, we have that Γact(α0) = Γact(β0) = L and
β0 ∈ dom (τ), again, by Invariant. In C ′0, we have – according to semantic rule
reply – R′0(fk) = E[s], R
′
β0
= Rβ0 unchanged, and the type Γfut(fk) is the
type of s and equally for fm. As before, α0 ∈ dom (τ) gives that Γact(α0) = L
by invariant(σ, τ). Hence, there exist α1, β1 with {(α0, α1), (β0, β1)} ⊆ τ , and
fj , fh with {(fk, fj), (fm, fh)} ⊆ σ giving us a similar situation in configuration
C1 as C1(α1) = α1[R1, t1] with R1(fj) = Eσ,τ [fh] and C1(β1) = β1[Rβ1 , tβ1 ]
with Rβ1(fh) = sσ,τ . Now, we can select C
′
1 according to semantic rule (reply)
such that R′1(fj) = E[sσ,τ ], R
′
β1
= Rβ1 ; hence C1 →‖ C ′1. Set τ ′ = τ and σ′ = σ,
then C ′0 ∼σ,τ C ′1 because R′0(fk) ∼σ,τ R′1(fj) and R′α0(fm) ∼σ,τ R′α0(fh).
Case 6 (update-AO). For C0 →‖ C ′0 with update-AO, let C0(α0) =
α0[R0, t0], C0(β0) = β0[Rβ0 , tβ0 ] and R0(fk) = E[β0.l := ς(x, y)s]. Then, fol-
lowing the semantics, the post-state is R′0(fk) = E[γ0], C
′
0(γ0) = γ0[∅, tβ0 .l :=
ς(x, y)s] for some fresh γ0. Again, we have since α0 and, consequently, β0 ∈
dom (τ) that they are L by Invariant. Thus there are, in C1, corresponding
names α1, β1, fj with {(α0, α1), (β0, β1)} ⊆ τ and (fk, fj) ∈ σ and C1(α1) =
α1[R1, t1], C1(β1) = β1[Rβ1 , tβ1 ]. Since R0 ∼σ,τ R1 and tα1 =σ,τ tβ1 , we have
R1(fj) = Eσ,τ [β1.l := ς(x, y)sσ,τ ], we can set C ′1 – consistent with the se-
mantics – such that R′1(fj) = Eσ,τ [γ1], C
′
1(γ1) = γ1[∅, tβ1 .l := ς(x, y)sσ,τ ] =
γ1[∅, tα1σ,τ .l := ς(x, y)sσ,τ ], hence C1 →‖ C ′1. Set τ ′ = τ ∪ {(γ0, γ1)}, σ′ = σ.
The type Γact(γ0) = Γact(γ1) = L since tα1 , tβ1 are L and thus the updates as
well. Thus, with the extension, the Invariant stays valid, and we can conclude,
again, C ′0 ∼σ,τ C ′1.
Corollary 2.2.9 (Noninterference of Reachable Configurations). Let C0 and
C1 be configurations reachable from some initial indistinguishable configurations
then there exist σ and τ such that C0 ∼σ,τ C1.
The corollary follows by induction over →‖ from Lemma 2.2.7, Corollary
2.2.8, and the Noninterference Theorem.
2.3 Conclusions
We now endeavour to interpret the formal presentation given in the paper. To
this end, we summarize some lessons learnt, discuss some related work to finally
conclude with possible alternatives that might improve the practical relevance
of the presented result and thus the applicability of ASPfun for security-critical
systems.
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2.3.1 Lessons Learnt
The noninterference type system may seem overly restrictive: activities can only
communicate with other activities if they have exactly the same security class.
One might think that the typing rules can be defined in a more liberal way:
an activity should be allowed to receive replies from activities at a lower level
and activities should be able to utter requests to a higher level. This would
represent a write up and a read down, respectively, which are consistent with
the no read up and no write down idea. However, we omitted this completely
from the exposition – also to facilitate the reasoning – but as we believe rightly
for the following reason. A request is only uttered to receive a corresponding
reply. That is, method call in ASPfun is only complete in the combination
request plus reply. But then, clearly, the two restrictions pointed out before
enforce the requesting and the receiving activity to be on the same level. This
is a well-known problem from security in distributed systems.
Our approach follows a method for defining and proving noninterference that
stems from the application to imperative programs [16, 1]. Since ASPfun is a
functional language, we simply interpret data values as the terms contained
in the request list of an activity. This reflects that – although functional –
ASPfun activities contain the current state of evaluation. Consequently, the
initial configuration represents the input to an ASPfun program. The output
are the terms that remain in the future lists of the activities when the activities
are fully evaluated. Therefore, a security policy for ASPfun is given by the initial
setting of the security level for the term in an initial configuration. (The fact
that we define indistinguishability for the initial configuration represents the
gist of the security policy: a legal security policy assigns the security values
such that for L-indistinguishable initial values no information is leaked).
The fact that activities may only communicate with others that are exactly
on their level means, practically, that a remote activity can only interact with
foreign activities in its remote domain if they are of the same class.
In some sense this makes the L class equivalent to the H class and fails to
correspond to the Multi-Level-Security model (MLS) [4] where information may
flow up according to some hierarchical security lattice. In another sense, the
strictness corresponds to the needs of a distributed object community. When
considering privacy, we enforce thereby that activities are only accessible to
other activities of the same private class. But then we need to have a separate
class for each user. The typing and the related noninterference result remain
valid. Technically, the argument has to be interpreted as H is the class of
this user, and the L-class represents the rest of the world. In fact, this is the
right assumption for a privacy oriented model: we assume the worst case, that
the entire surrounding system is corrupted and exchanges information. Trusted
object communities can only be those that are proved to be noninterfering with
the rest of the hostile community and this is the same as that the trusted
community is also of this users H-class.
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2.3.2 Related Work
The approach by Boudol and Castellani is, similar to ours, based on the work
by Volpano, Smith, and Irvine [19]. As in the paper [16], Boudol and Castellani
address the problem that concurrent while loops can implement implicit flows
from the while-control variable x to other observing processes which in case
that x is H (and the observer is L) represents an implicit flow. They improve
Volpano and Smith’s original very restrictive type system that forbids H in
while-control by a more fine-grained approach. The main difference of both
works to our language is that they are concerned with access to shared data
which we completely ignore as we assume separate data spaces for activities.
Inside our activities the concurrent threads represented by future values are
functional and have no side effects.
Sabelfeld and Mantel define a type-based approach for distributed programs
[13]. Their approach differs in that it is entirely concentrated on channels
and their security types. There are many similarities, they also consider asyn-
chronous communication, for example, but in our model the message passing
abstracts from channels. Even regarding their explicit approach to channels
with encryption and devices for detection of timing leaks, we still could not find
an answer to the obvious – and well-known, as sketched above – problem that
in distributed systems secure communication quickly becomes restricted to one
class.
Concerning the ς-calculus we need to mention the early work by Barthe and
Serpette [3].
None of the above mentioned works is formalised in an interactive theorem
prover. We believe – and might have convinced the reader with the exposition
of the noninterference proof – that type systems and safety proofs, in particular
noninterference proofs, deserve a rigorous mechanical verification.
Concerning related mechanized noninterference work, there are several in-
teresting works. We would like to mention a couple that are close to our work
presented in this paper. An Isabelle/HOL formalisation exists by Naumann of
a portion of their imperative language [14]. Concerning parallel languages, the
work by Barthe and Prensa-Nieto presents an Isabelle/HOL formalisation of a
parallel language [2].
2.3.3 Future Work
We plan to formalise the security model and proofs in Isabelle/HOL based on
the complete formalisation of ASPfun in this interactive theorem prover.
One point we would like to investigate is whether the semantics can be
slightly adapted to enable a list of initial activities, or, an initial configuration
with a list of initial terms. This would enable to experiment with activities of
different classes. We see the possibilities worth investigating as follows.
• We could allow several activities in an initial configuration. These would
be similar to the single one in the current definition, i.e. contain no ref-
erences to futures and other activities. Thereby, the semantics would not
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change much, previous results remain valid, and the noninterference proof
can be also adapted. The definition of initial indistinguishability would
need to be scaled up but this represents no problem. Advantage is that
the changes to model and proofs are small, but it is not clear whether this
change would bring about the desired generality. Although we can have
now various activities of type H and L, initially, there are no references
in the initial activities, so the question remains, how can activities know
of each other so they can communicate – provided they are in the same
class. To this end, we would need some kind of global name registry, but
then names would become first class citizens of the language. Although
names are already part of the language as activity references, the name
registry representation implies a richer model where names have some sort
of specification attached to it.
• Scaling down the problem of several differently typed elements in the initial
configuration, the next possibility is to have security classes only for fu-
tures and not for activities and enabling several possibly differently typed
futures in the request list of the initial configuration. The problem, here,
is again the name spacing; we equally need some register if we want to
exclude references in the initial future values. Concerning proofs we loose
the confinement property at the activity level, but might regain one at
something like the “future level”.
• One level zoomed in again, we could envisage that various parts of a ς-
term in a future could have different types. The name registry problem
remains, and the confinement question becomes even more critical. We
might now establish some sort of “thread” confinement.
In all cases a name registry seems to be necessary to realize non-trivial commu-
nication amongst different tribes, i.e. families of object with equal security class,
in the active object community. The further we zoom into the terms following
the previous three approaches, it becomes more likely that this registry might
even be a first-class citizen of ASPfun, i.e. programmed as an activity itself.
However, at the same time, the more we zoom in, the more proofs deviate from
what we have presented here.
It is also worth investigating whether the view that several security classes
exist can be made explicit in our model. Although the informal privacy argu-
ment in the previous subsection is clear enough, it is just technically interesting
to see how partial bijections can be scaled up to more than just L and H. Note,
that the classical technique of “undefined for H” does not simply scale up. Al-
though not relevant for the restrictive security model of ASPfun presented in this
paper, it might be interesting for more liberal approaches that use a nontrivial
security lattice, like the Decentralized Label Model (DLM) by A. C. Myers [12].
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Chapter 3
Distributed Consensus
3.1 Paxos
The Paxos algorithm, e.g. [10, 11] is a classical algorithm for the implementation
of the distributed consensus problem. That is, it is an algorithm that enables a
common vote amongst distributed processes that communicate asynchronously.
In this note, we very briefly sum up the algorithm in its simplest form. We then
present an implementation of Paxos in ASPfun[8]. This practical implementation
serves to illustrate the use of ASPfun, leading into a discussion of the capacities
and characteristics of ASPfun as a distributed computation model.
We first introduce the functioning by listing some important properties of
the algorithm followed by its protocol.
• Communication is asynchronous, messages may be delayed, lost but not
changed.
• Possible roˆles are leader (proposer), acceptor, and learner; any agent/process
can act in any of those three roˆles.
• The Paxos algorithm is a protocol in two phases:
– A proposer first proposes to a group of acceptors a number n rep-
resenting a possible vote; propositions are numbered in increasing
order
– Acceptors promise to stick to that possible vote n unless they have
already promised a larger vote m > n
– If the proposer receives a majority (quorum) of positive promises he
asks in phase2 the majority to finally accept vote (n, v) for some v.
• Acceptors accept any vote (unless its number is too low).
For simplicity, we initially assume that proposer and learner are identical and are
unique (for an important complication caused by several proposers see Section
3.3).
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5 55
Figure 3.1: Phase 1: leader proposes to three acceptors in different states.
Then, the Paxos algorithm consists of two phases, comprising message ex-
changes between a leader Λ and a community of acceptors αi, where i ∈ N.
phase1 : Λ→ αi : proposition n
αi → Λ :

(n, 〈〉val) if n is largest proposition and
no value accepted so far
(m, v) if n is largest proposition and
v accepted with m ≤ n
Nack n < last accepted proposal
phase2 : Λ→ αi : accept!(n, v)
αi → Λ :
{
accepted(n, v) if last accepted proposal ≤ n
Nack n < last accepted proposal
Note, that – in principle – an acceptor has to accept any vote that is proposed
to him. An intuition for the use of Paxos is that the proposer acts as a server
interface to some external client asking him to coordinate a group of processes,
for example, to do a distributed database commit.
The illustrations given in Figures 3.1 to 3.4 illustrate the Paxos algorithm –
the variables used in the graphics are introduced in the following section.
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Figure 3.2: Phase 1: one acceptor promises with no prior value, one refuses due
to prior acceptance of higher proposition, and one promises by returning last
accepted value.
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Figure 3.3: Phase 2: leader asks those that have promised to accept highest
value.
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Figure 3.4: Phase 2: the quorum accepts, unless . . . (see Section 3.3.1)
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3.2 Paxos in ASPfun
We present the Paxos algorithm in ASPfun by first introducing the agent object,
a common type of object that can be used to represent proposers and accep-
tors alike. That is, the agent contains all necessary functionality for proposing
and accepting votes. In particular, an agent object contains a list of activity
references called “acceptors” representing the community of agents that can be
asked to vote on a value.
agent : [acceptors = 〈α, β, γ, . . .〉,paxosfun = . . . , . . .]
We assume as given a few basic data structures. For example lists, are denoted
as above, using brackets 〈 and 〉, the emtpy list 〈〉list, their construction as x :: l,
and the append operator for lists is @. Furthermore, we use the datastructures
of booleans, natural numbers, pairs, a type of values including an empty value
denoted as 〈〉val. The empty active object is denoted by 〈〉obj.
We next assume a set of agent objects, an already chosen leader Λ such that
the basic configuration for the Paxos algorithm initially is something like the
following, where Λ is the leader activity; an initial call to the Paxos algorithm
– implemented in each agent as a method – is placed on the request queue of
this (unique) leader Λ as future f0.
[ Λ[f0 7→ Λ.paxosfun(v), [acceptors = 〈α0, α1, α2, . . .〉,paxosfun = . . . , . . . ]]
α0[∅, [acceptors = 〈〉,paxosfun = . . . , . . .]],
α1[∅, [acceptors = 〈〉,paxosfun = . . . , . . .]],
α2[∅, [acceptors = 〈〉,paxosfun = . . . , . . .]],
. . .
]
We will next step through the various fields and methods of an agent, explain
informally their purpose and whether they belong to the role of an agent as
proposer or acceptor. In the next section we will discuss alternatives and what
the implementation tells us about the expressiveness of ASPfun.
The status of an acceptor needs to store the last accepted proposal – which is
only a natural number – and the last accepted value – a number and a value. We
define the agent fields ‘lap’ (last accepted proposition) and ‘lav’ (last accepted
value) initializing them with defaults.
lap = 0
lav = (0, 〈〉val)
For the roˆle of an acceptor we need methods to manipulate these two memory
fields. If an acceptor receives a new proposal n of the leader in phase 1 of the
algorithm, it needs to record this in lap unless it is a proposal that is less than
the last proposition. Therefore, each agent has the method choose prop.
choose prop = ς(x, n) if n ≥ x.lap then (x.lap := n, 〈〉obj) else (〈〉obj, x) end
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Similarly, each agent has a method acc val that changes the lav field of the
object if the value (i.e. its order number) is not less than the last proposition.
acc val = ς(x, (n, v)) if n ≥ x.lav then (x.lav := (n, v), 〈〉obj) else (〈〉obj, x) end
In both methods we encode the acceptance of the proposition or value by updat-
ing the corresponding fields and by the position (left/positive,right/negative) in
the result pair. This is due to a peculiarity of ASPfun: immutable objects (see
Section 3.3). We will see next how the two phases use the acceptor methods.
To iteratively apply these methods over all acceptors we use the function ‘map’
as a generic function over lists of objects. Intuitively, it can be implemented as
another method of agents as follows.
map = ς(x, (f, l)) if l = 〈〉 then〈〉 else hd(l).f :: (x.map(f, tl l)) end
However, this has to be seen as some sort of meta-program to be resolved in a
preprocessing step – because we do not have polymorphism in ASPfun. We use
map here to improve the readability of the algorithm. It can be easily replaced
by spelling out these maps in all three occurrences.
Now, phase 1 is implemented as a recursive method that given a list of
agents A (the possible acceptors) calls the choose prop method in each of those
objects. It then dissects the responses into positive promises (using a function
dissect defined below) and then checks whether a quorum (also defined below)
of positives is reached, i.e. more than half the acceptors promise to go with n;
otherwise it recurs.
phase1 = ς(x, (A,n))
let A0 = x.map (choose prop n) A
(Ap, An) = x.dissect A0
in if x.quorum Ap then (n,Ap)
else x.phase1(Ap@An, n+ 1) end
Note, that the recursion operates with the concatenation Ap@An not with A0
nor the original A. This is because objects that do promise become – due to
the special semantics (immutable objects) of ASPfun– replaced by new updated
objects. Hence, we need to keep the ones that accept as they were and merge
them with the ones that did not accept and remain the same. The following
method dissects a list of pairs of objects into a pair of lists of accepting and
rejecting objects,
dissect = ς(x, l)
if l = 〈〉list then 〈〉list
else ( if l = (o, 〈〉obj) :: l′ then addleft o (dissect l′)
else addright (hd l) (dissect l′) end) end)
where we assume two more basic list processing functions addright and addleft
as follows.
addleft x (l, l′) = (x :: l, l′)
addright x (l, l′) = (l, x :: l′)
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A quorum, i.e. a majority is a simple predicate using the length of the list of
the initial set of acceptors contained in an agent (really useful only in leaders).
quorum = ς(x,A) length A > (length x.acceptors)/2
The second phase of the algorithm assumes a successful phase 1 for some n and
then extracts the highest value accepted so far, otherwise v. It continues to
call the accept method acc val on all acceptors that have promised something
in phase 1 and succeeds if there is a quorum of acceptors that have accepted.
phase2 = ς(x, (A,n, v))
let (m,A0) = x.phase1(A,n)
h = highest val A0
vh = if h = 〈〉val then v else h end
A1 = x.map (acc val (m, vh)) A0
(Ap, An) = x.dissect A1
in if x.quorum Ap then x.success := (Ap, vh)
else x.phase2(Ap@An,m+ 1, vh) end
The method highest val now selects from a list of objects the value that has the
highest ordering number.
highest val = ς(x, l) fst(x.hval l (0, 〈〉val))
hval = ς(x, (l, v))
if l = 〈〉list then v
else ( let l = o :: l′
in (if fst(o.lav) > fst v then x.hval l′ (o.lav)
else x.hval l′ v end)
end) end)
Finally the method paxosfun offers the algorithm as a method to a client object.
paxosfun = ς(x, v) (x.phase2)(x.acceptors, 0, v)
3.3 Discussion
3.3.1 No livelocks with Paxosfun
A typical livelock situation may occur in Paxos if two proposers exist [11, Section
2.4]: “proposer p completes phase 1 for a proposal number n1. Another proposer
q completes phase 1 for a proposal number n2 > n1. Proposer p’s phase 2 accept
requests for a proposal numbered n1 are ignored because the acceptors have all
promised not to accept any new proposal numbered less than n2. So, proposer p
then begins and completes phase 1 for a new proposal number n3 > n2, causing
the second phase 2 accept requests of proposer q to be ignored. And so on.”
Both proposers never arrive at the end of their protocol successfully because
in the meantime between the two phases the other one has given out a higher
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Figure 3.5: Possible livelock in Paxos.
proposition. The acceptors continuously upgrade their promises but they never
accept a value. There is constant activity, one might even say progress, but
the goal of the Paxos algorithm is never achieved; we call this a livelock. The
livelock situation is depicted in Figure 3.5.
To overcome this situation, the only solution Lamport proposes [11] is to
“. . . elect[ing] a single distinguished proposer.”
In our language ASPfun, the livelock cannot even occur simply because we
are functional. To be more precise, this is due to the semantics of the update
for active objects creating a copy of the original object with the fields updated.
In our Paxos implementation in ASPfun, whenever an acceptor saves a chosen
proposition, this agent is copied, the copy stores the new lap or lav values
corresponding to the proposition, and the copy replaces the original agent. The
original agent in its original state is nevertheless preserved in case it features in
some other context.
In the following it is this new object that represents – also from the point
of view of the proposer – the (new) acceptor. Hence, if there is originally one
community of acceptors to which two concurring proposers have access – as soon
as they start proposing their conflicting numbers n – two new communities are
created, each of them obeying one proposer. The livelock cannot occur. This
phenomenon is illustrated in Figure 3.6
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Figure 3.6: No livelock for Paxos in ASPfun!
3.3.2 Paxosturbo in active objects with futures
In principle, the entire Paxos can be simply implemented with active objects
and futures by a one line algorithm Paxosturbo: proposer tells all its acceptors to
accept value n. Since, the asynchronous communication in active objects with
futures consists of request and response in one step – represented by a future
– the loss of messages is not expressible. This is not specific to ASPfun; it is
true also for ASP and ProActive. Concerning the delay of messages, Paxosturbo
would work in ASPfun– because a reply is possible even for unevaluated futures
– but in ASP and Proactive this would cause a so-called wait by necessity.
However, when implementing the above “Paxosturbo” in ASP and ASPfun
there are differences. In a situation of concurring requests the ASP fun solution
may deadlock through concurring requests, whereas the ASPfun solution just
produces two communities, as seen in the previous case of two proposers.
3.3.3 Modelling message delay and loss
Although the delay and loss of messages is not naturally implemented with our
communication based on futures, we now explain how the Paxos implementation
can be easily extended to simulate this. Since Paxos originates, presumably,
from a Greek “part-time parliament” where parliament members could walk in
and out of the parliament, message delay and loss is one decisive requirement
to the algorithm. In fact, as we have seen in the previous section, if loss and
delay are excluded, the algorithm becomes a trivial one line command.
To simulate the partiality of the parliament in our ASPfun implementation
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we simply add to the responses of the acceptors an additional randomness, based
on a random variable r ∈ {0, 1}. When an acceptor must choose or accept –
according to the rules of the algorithm – he may now – in the extended version
– decide to say nothing instead. The choice of which – to reply honestly or
to pretend not being there – is based on the random r. We simply treat the
pretence of absence in the same manner as a negative decision, thereby greatly
simplifying this extension. From the point of view of the proposer, loss and
delay must be treated in the same manner as negative responses. Concretely,
we simply replace the two functions choose prop and acc val by the following
adapted versions; otherwise the algorithm stays the same.
choose prop’ = ς(x, n) let r = rnd {0, 1}
in if (n ≥ x.lap) ∧ r = 1
then (x.lap := n, 〈〉obj)
else (〈〉obj, x) end
acc val’ = ς(x, (n, v)) let r = rnd {0, 1}
in if n ≥ (x.lav) ∧ r = 1
then (x.lav := (n, v), 〈〉obj)
else (〈〉obj, x) end
3.3.4 Language based deadlock prevention.
When implementing the mutual exclusion problem – where each process claims
exclusive control of a common resource – imperative ASP and functional ASPfun
show quite different features and different qualities of modelling. In this situa-
tion of concurring requests, the ASP solution may deadlock, whereas in ASPfun,
where no common data areas exist, each request just produces a new copy of
the original object with the fields updated, as seen in the example of Section
3.3.1.
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